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Contextual preference reversals occur when a preference for one option over another is reversed by the
addition of further options. It has been argued that the occurrence of preference reversals in human
behavior shows that people violate the axioms of rational choice and that people are not, therefore,
expected value maximizers. In contrast, we demonstrate that if a person is only able to make noisy
calculations of expected value and noisy observations of the ordinal relations among option features, then
the expected value maximizing choice is influenced by the addition of new options and does give rise to
apparent preference reversals. We explore the implications of expected value maximizing choice,
conditioned on noisy observations, for a range of contextual preference reversal types—including
attraction, compromise, similarity, and phantom effects. These preference reversal types have played a
key role in the development of models of human choice. We conclude that experiments demonstrating
contextual preference reversals are not evidence for irrationality. They are, however, a consequence of
expected value maximization given noisy observations.
Keywords: expected value maximization, preference reversals, rationality, choice
One of the successes of the rational analysis of human cognition
has been that a number of apparent irrational behaviors have been
shown to be rational given different assumptions about what
shapes adaptation (Hahn & Warren, 2009; Le Mens & Denrell,
2011; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Trimmer, 2013). For example,
Hahn and Warren (2009) have shown that a consideration of an
individual’s experience of a fair coin toss and of the bounds
imposed by working memory can explain seemingly biased per-
ceptions of randomness. Similarly, Oaksford and Chater (1994)
proposed that human reasoning might be understood as rational
relative to the ecology of an uncertain world, rather than irrational
relative to deductive logic. Despite such successes, one apparent
irrationality of human behavior that continues to challenge the
rational perspective is the contextual preference reversal (Huber,
Payne, & Puto, 1982; Huber & Puto, 1983; Pettibone & Wedell,
2007; Soltani, Martino, & Camerer, 2012; Trueblood, 2012; True-
blood, Brown, Heathcote, & Busemeyer, 2013; Tversky & Simon-
son, 1993; Wedell, 1991). In the current article, we report an
analysis of contextual preference reversals that shows that human
choice can be considered computationally rational (Lewis, Howes,
& Singh, 2014) given the uncertainty introduced by perceptual and
cognitive capacities. The main contribution of this analysis is to
show that preference reversals are inevitable signatures of a ratio-
nal response to the structure of the decision task and simple
assumptions concerning perceptual and cognitive processing. In
particular, preference reversals are a rational consequence of noisy
observations of subjective expected utility and of the ordinal
relations between features. Despite the minimal nature of these
assumptions, we show in this article that the theory predicts and
provides deep explanations of several types of empirically ob-
served preference reversals—empirical regularities that have
played a key role in the development of process theories of choice
that are not grounded in utility maximization.
Contextual preference reversals occur when a preference for one
option (expressed through behavioral choice) over another is re-
versed by the availability of further options. Consider a simple
example. When asked whether you would like a healthy apple A or
a cake B that has 30 g of sugar, you might choose the apple.
However, when told that a second cake D is available (a decoy)
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that has 40 g of sugar, you might switch preference to B. A person
who makes such a switch makes a contextual preference reversal.
Typically, in preference reversal experiments options are described
explicitly in terms of two attribute dimensions and not just one. For
example, in the experiments reported by Huber et al. (1982) the
dimensions included the price and quality of beer. In the Wedell
(1991) experiments participants were offered options with numeric
probability and value features. In both of these circumstances, a
choice between, say, A and B is difficult because A might be higher
than B on one dimension, but lower on the other.
In the decision making literature, a taxonomy of preference
reversal types has been introduced that depends on the relative
positioning of options A, B, and D in the multidimensional
attribute-value space. One well-studied type is the attraction ef-
fect. A gamble version of a preference reversal task with an
attraction effect decoy is illustrated in Figure 1. Option B has a
higher value v than option A but a lower probability p. Option B
dominates D but not A. Options A and B have approximately equal
expected value. In the Figure, given the position of B, A appears in
the top left, and D in the rectangle below B. The presence of D
tends to increase the proportion of B choices. This is known as an
attraction effect because the decoy “attracts” choices to the target,
where the target is the dominating option.
In addition to multiattribute decision problems (Huber et al.,
1982; Huber & Puto, 1983; Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Tver-
sky, 1992) and gambles (Herne, 1999; Wedell, 1991), other par-
adigms have been used to study contextual reversals. One study
used political candidates as stimuli (O’Curry & Pitts, 1995). More
recently, reversals have been observed in choices between rectan-
gles with different areas (Trueblood et al., 2013) and they have
been the subject of analysis in economics (Loomes, 2005). The
effect has also been shown in zoology (Latty & Beekman, 2011;
Parrish, Evans, & Beran, 2015; Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, & Kacel-
nik, 2004), including in birds (Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2003;
Shafir, Waite, & Smith, 2002), bees (Shafir et al., 2002), and
ameboid organisms (Latty & Beekman, 2011). In humans it can be
attenuated by increasing blood glucose levels (Masicampo &
Baumeister, 2008), elaborating the descriptions of attributes (Rat-
neshwar, Shocker, & Stewart, 1987), and by increasing the differ-
ence in expected value between the two options (Farmer, 2014). It
has also been observed in perceptual-motor decisions (Farmer,
El-Deredy, Howes, & Warren, 2015).
The fact that people make contextual preference reversals has
been taken as evidence against normative theories of human
choice. In particular, many have suggested that preference reversal
phenomena indicate that people do not make independent evalu-
ations of each option (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Huber et al., 1982;
Louie & Glimcher, 2012; Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Tversky,
1992; Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2012; Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater,
2010; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Preference reversals suggest
that the values of each option are influenced by additions to the set
of available options, which constitutes a violation of the Indepen-
dence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom required in many
value maximizing models (e.g., Luce, 1959). As its name suggests,
the axiom demands that a preference between two options is not
changed by the addition of an option to the set of what is available.
There is a common view that contextual preference reversals are
evidence that people violate value maximization. This belief has
survived for at least 20 years. According to Tversky & Simonson
(1993, p. 1179):
The standard theory of choice—based on value maximization—
associates with each option a real value such that, given an offered set,
the decision maker chooses the option with the highest value. Despite
its simplicity and intuitive appeal, there is a growing body of data that
is inconsistent with this theory.
In the same article, Tversky and Simonson describe why they
believe that context effects are evidence against value maximiza-
tion (p. 1188):
The analysis of context effects, in perception as well as in choice,
provides numerous examples in which people err by complicating
rather than by simplifying the task; they often perform unnecessary
computations and attend to irrelevant aspects of the situation under
study.
More recently, Usher, Elhalal, and McClelland (2008, p. 297)
state, “. . . contextual reversal effects . . . demonstrate a limitation
of rationality in choice preference.” Simonson (2014, p. 1) states,
. . . the belief in irrationality is now widely accepted among the
general public. The most commonly used operationalization of irra-
tionality among decision researchers has been based on violations of
value maximization. Preferring a dominated option or expressing
different preferences depending on the framing of options . . . dem-
onstrate[s] . . . the absence of stable preferences and resulting irratio-
nal decisions.
The main response in psychology and behavioral economics to
the apparent empirical failures of normative models of decision
making has been to pursue process theories of the mechanisms that
value (v)
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(p) A (competitor)
B (target)
D (decoy)
Figure 1. In one type of contextual preference reversal experiment two
options A and B are each described in terms of two features, for example
a probability p and value v. A has a higher probability and B has a higher
value. A has the same expected value as B and they are, therefore, both on
the same line of equal expected value (the dotted curve). A decoy D is
placed in the rectangle to the left and below either A or B (B in the figure).
The decoy in the figure is dominated by B but not by A. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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underlie human choice. This approach embraces the distinction
that the normative models prescribe what decision making ought to
be like, and the psychological mechanism or process theories
describe how it actually works in humans. Many of these process
theories have indeed provided successful empirical accounts, and
we briefly review several of the key contributions below. Never-
theless, despite the number and diversity of such theories, they
have not been deployed with the purpose of explaining preference
reversals as a rational adaptation.
In contrast to the process theories, our aim in the work presented
here is to pursue a rational account that explains phenomena as a
consequence of expected value maximization and cognitive con-
straints (Hahn, 2014; Howes, Lewis, & Vera, 2009; Lewis et al.,
2014). This approach is, therefore, one way to pursue an under-
standing of human cognition as computationally rational (Lewis et
al., 2014). This approach has precedents in other areas of cognitive
science. For example, in the account of aimed movement offered
by Meyer, Abrams, Kornblum, Wright, and Smith (1988), the
movement strategy optimizes a speed–accuracy trade-off given
constraints on the available noisy neuromotor control signals. The
authors explicitly frame their contribution as relevant to the “de-
gree to which mental processes incorporate rational and normative
rules.” Similarly, in the analysis by Maloney and Mamassian
(2009) of target selection for aimed movement, the optimal aim
point is derived using decision theory given the assumptions that
motor performance is noisy and that people try to maximize an
objective function in which there is a trade-off between the number
of points awarded for hitting a target and avoiding a penalty
region. The aim point chosen by a participant is a consequence of
the particular individual’s bivariate Gaussian distribution of end
points around each possible aim point and the objective function.
The aim point predicted by decision theory is the aim point that
maximizes expected utility, and there is no need to fit the param-
eters of the decision model to the outcome data.
A number of contributions to the broader decision making
literature have argued that preference reversals can be rational
(Bordley, 1992; McNamara, Trimmer, & Houston, 2014; Shenoy
& Yu, 2013; Trimmer, 2013). For example, Trimmer (2013) shows
that, in an evolutionary context, even options that are never chosen
by an animal can be relevant to a decision. Bordley (1992) argues
that individuals have prior expectations about the value of lotteries
and if these are taken into account then preference reversals will
follow.1 A more detailed discussion of these contributions is
provided at the end of the current article.
In the following sections of the article:
1. We review existing models of preference reversals in
humans.
2. We present a new model of choice between options. The
model is of a task where a human is asked to choose
between options each consisting of a set of features, for
example a probability and a value. This task is used in the
preference reversal paradigm reported by Wedell (1991).
The model combines two noisy observations of each
option. The first observation is based on noisy calcula-
tion of the model’s subjective expected utility. The sec-
ond observation is a noisy observation of ordinal rela-
tions, which is a noisy encoding of the partial ordering
of the magnitudes of the presented probabilities and
values. The model chooses the expected value maximiz-
ing option given these observations.
The assumption that there is noise in perceptual and
cognitive processes, and perhaps uncertainty in prefer-
ences, is uncontroversial (Costello & Watts, 2014; Faisal,
Selen, & Wolpert, 2008; Hilbert, 2012; Loomes, 2005;
Maloney & Mamassian, 2009; Seymour & McClure,
2008; Warren, Graf, Champion, & Maloney, 2012). The
use of ordinal observations is consistent with recent ev-
idence that people make ordinal feature comparisons in
service of decisions (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014).
3. We show that the model predicts preference reversals.
We also show that it obtains higher expected value than
a model that only makes use of noisy calculation.
4. We apply the model to a previously reported empirical
study of preference reversals (Wedell, 1991). The model
predicts preference reversals in three conditions where it
is observed in humans and predicts its absence where it is
not.
5. We show that the model predicts related contextual pref-
erence reversal phenomena, namely the compromise and
similarity effects (Maylor & Roberts, 2007; Trueblood,
2012; Trueblood et al., 2013; Tversky, 1972; Tversky &
Russo, 1969). The compromise and similarity decoy po-
sitions differ from the attraction decoy positions illus-
trated in Figure 1. The compromise decoy might, for
example, have a higher probability than A and a lower
value, so as to make A a compromise between the decoy
and B. The compromise decoy causes the intermediate
item to be selected more often than it would otherwise.
The similarity decoy, as its name suggests, has the same
expected value as the other options and a very similar
probability and value to one of them. The similarity
decoy causes the similar option to be selected less often.
6. We use the model to generate predictions for the phantom
decoy effect. The phantom decoy is positioned so as to
dominate one of the other options on at least one dimen-
sion, but is not available for choice. The predictions are
supported by the results of Soltani et al. (2012) but not by
those of Pettibone and Wedell (2000, 2007). We discuss
the contradictions between these studies.
7. We use the model to generate predictions for the effect of
time pressure (Pettibone, 2012) on preference reversals.
As time pressure increases preference reversal effects
tend to diminish.
8. We discuss the implications of our findings for process
theories of cognition, and contrast our model to others
1 Shenoy and Yu (2013) was brought to our attention by a reviewer of a
previous version of the current article that had been submitted before
publication of Shenoy and Yu (2013). The two approaches were conducted
independently.
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that also consider the rationality of preference reversals
(Bordley, 1992; McNamara et al., 2014; Shenoy & Yu,
2013; Trimmer, 2013).
Background: Models of Preference Reversals
We focus in what follows on models of human preference
reversals in consumer product choice and gamble experiments.
Because it is the primary contextual preference reversal type, we
first introduce the attraction decoy task in more detail. We subse-
quently introduce the related decoys (the compromise, similarity,
phantom, and inferior but nondominated decoys) in a later section
of the article.
The attraction effect preference reversals, as illustrated in Figure
1, are observed experimentally when participants are asked to
choose between options from various product categories including
cars, restaurants, and beers (Huber et al., 1982). Each pair of
options presented to participants shared two features such as price
and quality. Two options A and B, with approximately equal utility
such that each dominated the other on one of the features were
presented. Two weeks after choosing between A and B in each of
the categories, 93 participants returned to answer the same choice
problems but with the decoy D added. The result, aggregated
across product categories, was a nine point increase in percentage
share for the option that dominated the new decoy. A follow up
study (Huber & Puto, 1983) showed that the effect could also be
achieved when the decoy is inferior to, but not strictly dominated
by, one of the options.
The attraction effect has also been shown in choices between
gambles (Wedell, 1991). The stimuli all had an expected value of
approximately $10, but with different probabilities and values. For
example, one problem was to choose between (.83, $12), (.67,
$15), and (.78, $10). The last gamble in this set, the decoy, can be
ruled out because both its P and its V are less than those in the first
gamble. Choosing between the first two gambles is difficult be-
cause while one gamble dominates on P, the other dominates on V.
A paired task was to choose between (.83, $12), (.67, $15), and
(.62, $13). The first two gambles are the same as before but the
new decoy is dominated by the second gamble rather than the first.
In this paradigm, preference reversals can be measured as the
proportion of pairs on which the dominating gamble is chosen in
both variants. This study resulted in about 20% of choices exhib-
iting the attraction effect preference reversal.
There have been many attempts to explain preference reversals
in terms of underlying psychological processes. According to one
early account, Range-Frequency Theory (Parducci, 1974), option
D in Figure 1 extends the range of values on the y-axis thereby
making B’s loss to A appear smaller than if option D were not
present (Huber et al., 1982). In motivational accounts, it has been
proposed that a participant’s desire to be able to justify their choice
to the experimenter leads them to prefer a dominating option
(Simonson, 1989). The argument is that it is easier to justify
choosing B because it dominates one of the other options and A
does not.
Tversky and Simonson (1993) proposed that preference rever-
sals can be explained in terms of two psychological processes: a
process that weights the effect of the background to the decision,
and a comparison process that describes the effect of the local
context. The local context might consist of a choice between three
beers, and the background, experienced before the local context,
might have included five or six other beers. The background
process increases the value of options in the local context if, for
example, they have a price that is lower than prices of beers in the
background. The local context process increases the value of
options that are better than proximal options that are also in the
local context, and it does so by summing the relative advantage
that each option has over other options in the set (Tversky &
Simonson, 1993, p. 1186). The model calculates the relative ad-
vantage that each option has over other options on each feature. In
the attraction effect, the dominating option’s relative advantage
over the decoy exceeds the relative advantage of the other option
over the decoy. Therefore, when the nondecoy options are com-
pared only with each other, they will have equal choice probabil-
ity, but when the decoy is included in close proximity to one of the
options, this option will have a higher choice probability.
Another theory of preference reversals is provided by Decision
Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), which was devel-
oped as a general theory of the process of deliberation and accu-
mulation of preference over time in decision making. This neuro-
computational model was then extended (Roe, Busemeyer, &
Townsend, 2001) to explain contextual preference reversals. The
model is based on a connectionist network that accumulates pref-
erences for each option over time as the decision maker’s attention
switches, stochastically, between the different options and their
features. Roe et al. (2001) argue that the properties of this accu-
mulation process reveal how the attraction effect arises as a con-
sequence of computing values from differences. Option B wins
over A because it has a bigger relative value to the decoy D than
does A (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe et al., 2001).
In Multialternative Decision Field Theory (MDFT), each option
inhibits other options (Roe et al., 2001). The strength of this
inhibition is inversely proportional to the distance between the
options in the feature space. During the deliberation, the decoy
option comes to have a negative valence. Because the decoy
dominating option is nearer than the other option, it receives a
bigger boost from comparison and is more likely to be chosen. Roe
et al. (2001, p. 388) state that attraction effect reversals naturally
follow from the extended theory.
Another neuro-computational process model, the Leaky Com-
peting Accumulator (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2001) is a model
of perceptual choice and, as with DFT, it has been applied to the
problem of explaining contextual preference reversals (Usher et
al., 2008). In the model, a deliberation process involves comparing
the feature values of each option with each other option. The
calculated differences are then transformed into a preference state
via a loss averse value function. Because the nondominating option
suffers two large disadvantages (one to the decoy and one to the
other option, on the y-axis in Figure 1), and the dominating option
only suffers one large disadvantage (to the other nondecoy option
on the x-axis) the nondominating option accumulates less prefer-
ence and is chosen less often. This explanation is similar to that of
Tversky and Simonson’s (1993) context dependent preference. In
fact LCA can be seen as a neurally plausible implementation of
that model (Usher et al., 2008). In LCA the value function is
influenced by loss aversion. Usher et al. (2008, p. 297) argue that
their account of preference reversals “demonstrates a limitation of
rationality in choice preference.” In other words, it is a side effect
of a system adapted to other, or more general, purposes.
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Bhatia (2013) reports a process model of choice called the
associative accumulation model in which a number of effects,
including contextual preference reversals, are predicted as a con-
sequence of varying levels of association between a feature and an
option. Features that are more accessible, for example, because
they have stronger associations with options, are assumed to have
a bigger impact on the choices made. The level of accessibility can
be influenced by changes to the decision task such as adding more
options or changing the salience of existing options. The model’s
behavior is consistent with a large range of effects that include the
attraction, compromise and similarity effects as well as a gain-loss
asymmetry relative to a reference point, a range of reference depen-
dent phenomena, the alignability effect and the less-is-more effect.
Bhatia’s (2013) associative accumulation model is strongly influ-
enced by MDFT (Roe et al., 2001) and by LCA (Usher & McClel-
land, 2001) but it extends them by providing a formal account of the
whole decision making process (Bhatia, 2013, p. 539).
Trueblood, Brown, and Heathcote (2014) offer a process model
of context effects called the multiattribute linear ballistic accumu-
lator (MLBA). Unlike MDFT and LCA this model offers quanti-
tative accounts of the reversal effects. Where evaluations of MDFT
and LCA have only been made qualitatively, because of the
computational complexity of the simulations, MLBA has an ana-
lytic likelihood function that makes it tractable to fit experimental
data. MLBA models choice as a race for a threshold between
independent accumulators. The speed of each accumulator is de-
termined by a drift rate that is a function of weighted subjective
value comparisons, where the weights reflect the amount of atten-
tion paid to a particular comparison. It is hypothesized that atten-
tion weights should be larger when features are more similar and
weights should be smaller when features are easy to differentiate.
The model performs impressively when compared against MDFT
(see Figure 8 in Trueblood et al., 2014, p. 195).
Wollschläger and Diederich (2012) report a model of attraction,
compromise and similarity effects, and the associated decision
time. The core assumption of this model is that information is
sampled and used to increment counters. Each option has two
counters, one for positive information and one for negative infor-
mation. A random walk of the tree of possible states, where each
state is a vector of positive or negative information counters for
each option, is used to simulate the decision making process in the
standard contextual decision making conditions. The model suc-
cessfully predicts a range of the known phenomena. Unlike DFT
and LCA, inhibition is not required to explain these phenomena.
An advantage of the model is that it generates closed form pre-
dictions for choice proportions and decision time.
Other models suggest that the attraction effect might be the
consequence of low level neural information processing constraints,
such as firing rates. It is possible that relative estimates of value may
be a consequence of adaptation of neuronal firing to optimize sensi-
tivity across large ranges of value (Seymour & McClure, 2008). In
computational neuroscience, Soltani et al. (2012) have proposed a
model in which stimuli are normalized so as to be distinguishable by
neurons that have a firing rate of between 0 and a few hundred spikes
per second. Without normalization, neurons would not be able to
represent the range of experienced values. Soltani et al. (2012) show
that this neural constraint can lead to preference reversals. An impor-
tant contribution of this work is that it takes known facts about
constraints on the operation of neurons and works through their
implications for choice behavior.
In summary, contextual preference reversals have been taken as
strong evidence that human decision making processes do not con-
form to key axioms present in normative theories of rational choice.
This observation has led to a prevalent view that preference reversals
indicate that value maximization approaches cannot be used to ex-
plain behavior (Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Further, influential
process explanations of contextual preference reversals suggest the
effect is a consequence of cognitive-neural information processing
mechanisms (Roe et al., 2001; Usher et al., 2008). Preference rever-
sals, according to these explanations, are an outcome of a bounded
system failing to generate the normatively rational solution. In con-
trast, in what follows, we argue that the decoy provides information
that correctly implies that the dominating option has the highest
expected value. We demonstrate that a rational analysis can explain
why people exhibit a range of preference reversal types, including
attraction, compromise, similarity, and phantom. Thereby, we provide
an analysis of why neural cognitive-neural information processing
models should exhibit these effects.
A Model of Computationally Rational Choice
We assume that the decision problem in a preference reversal
experiment is an expected value maximizing choice between op-
tions, each of which is represented by a set of features, and where
the expected value of each option is a function of its features. Here
we focus on a task in which a choice must be made from a set of
gamble options as in Wedell (1991), each of which is sampled
from a distribution of possible options. Each option has a proba-
bility feature p and a value feature v.
The model makes a pair of observations of the options presented
in the experiment. One observation is a noisy calculation of the
model’s own subjective expected utility. The other observation is
a noisy encoding of the partial order of the features of the options,
here probabilities and values. (The order of the observations in the
model is not important.) We refer to the first observation as the
calculation observation and the second as the ordinal observation.
We assume that these two observations are subject to partially
uncorrelated noise. This is based on the assumption that the two
observation processes are not identical—that they need not operate
at the same time or on precisely the same perceptual input. (The
theory does not commit to the mechanistic sources of the noise.)
Having made the observations, the model chooses the option with
the highest expected value given these two noisy observations.
The model is illustrated in Figure 2 and a corresponding formal
description is given below. Both are illustrated with a choice
among three options, each defined by probability and value fea-
tures, but the model is easily generalizable to other numbers of
options, and other mappings from features to expected value.
1. Each option i  {A, B, D} is a gamble specified by a
probability, value pair.
2. The environment distribution E is the distributions of
probability and value. The probabilities p are sampled
from a distribution with range [0; 1] and the values v
are sampled from a distribution with a defined central ten-
dency and spread. Here we assume that the probabilities are
 distributed (with shape parameters a and b) and the values
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are Gaussian distributed (with parameters  and val) but
the model is not committed to these particular distributional
assumptions. The model allows for a correlation r between
p and v. In general, these distributions allow the modeling of
the distributions of probability and value in the adaptation
environment.
p ~ B(a, b) (1)
v ~ N,val2  (2)
r corr(p, v) (3)
3. The calculation observation is M  MA, MB, MD
where:
Mi piU(vi) E, E ~N0,calc2  (4)
The probability p is weighted by an exponential parameter
. The calculation of Mi is assumed to be subject to unbi-
ased Gaussian noise with standard deviation calc. This
calculation noise represents all of the noise experienced
through observing probabilities and values and calculating
each Mi. The calculation produces a noisy, and possibly
biased, estimate of the model’s own subjective expected
utility. If   1 and U(v) v then the observationMi is an
unbiased but noisy observation of the expected value.
4. The ordinal observation is a set R of partial orderings,
one for each feature type. To represent pairwise order
relations we define a function f which, subject to a
small probability of error errorf, maps pairs of real
numbers to a member of the set O  , , , where
two probabilities are defined as equal if their magni-
tudes are within tolerance 	p and two values are de-
fined as equal if their magnitudes are within tolerance
	v. The probability of ordinal error is the probability
that each order relationship is chosen uniformly ran-
domly from O. For probabilities, the function f is
defined as
f(pi, pj) , ,
 ,
iff pi pj	
p
iff | pi	 pj |  
p
iff pi pj
p
(5)
The set R is then the noisy encoding of the partial
orderings of probabilities and values:
R f(pA, pB), f(pA, pD), f(pB, pD),
f(vA, vB), f(vA, vD), f(vB, vD) (6)
5. The expected value of each option i given the observa-
tions is:
Figure 2. Given a choice task, the theory of bounds (to the left of the dotted line) is that people make two noisy
and partially independent observations of the task; one is a noisy, and possibly biased, calculation of subjective
expected utility (SEU) and the other a noisy ordinal observation. The order of the observations does not matter.
In the example in the figure the observation of MB is without error but the observation of MA and MD have been
affected by noise; the observation of R is without error. The analysis (to the right of the dotted line) chooses the
option with maximum expected value given the observations M, R and the environment E.
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EVM,R,E(i) (EV(i) |M,R, E) (7)
 (pi vi |M,R, E) (8)
where we denote the dependence on the observations and
environment with the superscriptM, R, E. EVM,R,Ei is
the model’s best estimate of EV(i) given a particular
observation of M, R in environment E. In Bayesian
terms, EVM,R,Ei is the posterior estimate of expected
value given the observations.
6. The expected values of all three options are compared
and the model chooses the option i with the largest
expected value:
i* arg max
iA
EVM,R,E(i) (9)
In summary, the model parameters are:
1. Parameters that define the environment distribution E.
These are the shape parameters a and b of the  distrib-
uted probabilities; the mean  and variance val2 of the
Gaussian distribution of values; and the correlation r
between the probability and value. (When we fit the
model to data we use the predictive t distribution to model
the distribution of values in the experiment.)
2. The calculation noise calc2 and probability weighting param-
eter  associated with the calculation observation M.
3. The probability of ordinal error P(errorf) associated with
determining feature ordinals R, and the ordinal tolerances.
The tolerances were set to the following values for all
analyses presented in the article: 	p  0.011 and 	v  1.1.
In the following sections we explore the consequences of the
free parameter settings for the preference reversal rate predicted by
the model.
Results: Deriving Implications of the Theory
All predictions reported in the following sections were gener-
ated using a numerical simulation that had the following stages.
• The simulation first constructed, via Monte Carlo sampling, a
tabular value function that mapped observations to expected
value. It sampled many tasks from the environment distribution
E, madeM,R observations, and computed conditional expected
values. An observation was a pairM,R and expected value
was a triple  EVM,R,EA, EVM,R,EB, EVM,R,ED  (see
Definition 7). These conditional expected values were com-
puted by taking the average of the true expected values for
the observed sample tasks that met the condition. One to
fifty billion samples were used to construct the value func-
tion tables in the simulations reported in the article. As
there are three levels of feature ordinal (greater, less, and
equal) and six relationships between features (Definition 6),
there are 36  729 possible ordinal observations R. The
three calculation observations M were binned into 120
levels to give 1203  1,728,000 possible observations M.
There were, therefore, a total of 1,259,712,000 possible
combined observations.
• Once the value function had been constructed it was used to
generate choice predictions for tasks (option sets) of inter-
est. These tasks were either tasks sampled from E, or they
were the Wedell (1991) tasks, or they were task types, such
as compromise and similarity, that were not studied by
Wedell (1991) but were generated as variants of the Wedell
tasks. Unless otherwise stated, the predictions for each task
were generated by sampling 1 million observations. For
each observation, the expected values were computed (us-
ing the tabular value function), and the option with the
highest conditional expected value was selected. (The
C2
code and executable are available online at http://
www-personal.umich.edu/rickl/)
Demonstration of Expected Value Maximization
To support the claim that it is rational to make use of ordinal
observations, we randomly generated three-option tasks from an
environment in which options had a probability feature p and a
value feature v (10 million tasks were sampled for each point in the
plot and each task was observed once). The probabilities p were 
distributed with parameters (a  1, b  1). The values v were
normally distributed with parameters (  100, val  5). The
correlation r between p and v was 0 and the probability weighting
parameter was   1. The maximum value to the model was
75.69. We compared the value of choices made by the simulation
described above to the value of choices made by a model that only
made use of calculation observations and to the value of choices
made by a model that only used ordinal observations. These
comparisons are illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows 2 panels. In each panel the true expected value
of the choice is plotted against noise level. In the left panel the
expected value is plotted against calculation noise calc. In this
panel, when calc  0 the combined observation model observes
calculation with perfect acuity and achieves the maximum value
from its choices. It does so by virtue of the fact that without noise
and with   1 the calculation observation observes expected
value, which is why the calculation only observation does as well
at calc  0. As noise in the calculation increases the value
received when only using calculation observation diminishes.
However, as this happens, the value of choices made by the
combined calculation and ordinal observation model, and, there-
fore, the expected value, diminishes less slowly because noise on
ordinal observations is not increasing.
In the right panel, expected value is plotted against the probability
of a feature order error P(errorf). In all three models a constant
calculation noise was used (calc 30), corresponding to a coefficient
of variation of 0.3. All other parameters were unaltered.
Attraction Effects
In this section we test whether the theory predicts the preference
reversals effects observed in Wedell (1991). Wedell’s experimen-
tal design has the virtues of systematically varying the decoy
position, and using gambles, so that there is an independent prin-
cipled basis for mapping from the features of each alternative to
expected value. We described this study briefly above and expand
the description here.
In each of the experimental conditions there were three options
{A, B, D}. In one condition the decoy was close to option A and in
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the other condition it was close to B. We refer to the option that is
proximal to the decoy as the target and the other option as the
competitor. (Terminology varies in the literature.) Option A always
had a higher probability and option B a higher value. Each partic-
ipant made two choices for each pair of gambles (one choice for
each decoy position).
In the first two experiments reported by (Wedell, 1991), four
positions for the decoy relative to the target were tested. These are
shown in Figure 4. The Range decoy (R), Frequency decoy (F),
Range-Frequency decoy (RF), and R’ (Rprime decoy) were each
set to test a different hypothesis. A preference reversal effect was,
as expected, observed in the asymmetric conditions (R, F, and RF)
where the decoy is positioned closer to one option than to the
other. Furthermore, as expected, the effect was not observed in the
symmetric condition (Rprime), where the decoy is dominated by
both A and B on the value dimension. Rprime is an important
control and shows that merely introducing any decoy is not suffi-
cient to cause preference reversals (Wedell, 1991). The probabil-
ities and values used to model the R, F, RF and Rprime tasks were
those used by (Wedell, 1991).
The theory was tested by generating predictions using the nu-
merical simulation described above. The effect of calculation noise
on preference reversals is shown in Figure 5. The y-axis shows the
reversal rate minus the inverse reversal rate. The reversal rate is
the proportion of trials on which participants selected A when the
decoy was at A and selected B when the decoy was at B for
matched trials that used identical gambles for A and B. In other
words, the reversal rate is the rate at which participants selected the
decoy dominating option in both of a pair of matched trials with
the same A, B features but different decoy positions. The inverse
reversal rate is the rate at which participants selected B when
the decoy was at A and A when the decoy was at B. The reversal
and inverse reversal rate were reported by Wedell (1991). The
inverse rate acts as a control for random variation. The param-
eters of the model were set as follows. The shape parameters of
the  distributed probabilities p were set to the maximum
likelihood values of (a  1, b  1) given Wedell’s task
distributions. The other parameters were set to the following
values:
Perrorf  0, r  0,   1, Uv  v.
Figure 3. The expected value of choice against coefficient of variation for the calculation error (left panel) and
coefficient of variation for the probability of ordinal error (right panel). The different lines are the expected values for
the following models: (a) both a calculation observation and an ordinal observation, (b) only a calculation observation,
and (c) only an ordinal observation are provided. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 4. Option positions (R, F, RF, and Rprime) used by Wedell
(1991). The dotted line represents the line of equal expected value on
which two of the three options sit (green circles). The third option is the
decoy (red triangle) and it is in one of two positions in each condition. Its
position varies according to condition but it is always dominated by one of
the other two options on at least one feature dimension (probability or
value). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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There are six panels in Figure 5, each representing the effect of one
level of noise on the calculation observation  {0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7,
0.9}. Each panel shows the reversal rate for different levels of the
location and scale of the environment distribution for feature values v.
The distribution of v used by Wedell was fitted with a scaled, shifted
t-distribution with location  19.60, scale  8.08, and df  100.
The results in Figure 5 show that preference reversals are
predicted as long as calculation noise is nonzero. When calculation
noise is zero (top left panel), the model predicts no preference
reversals. The panels show how the predicted reversal rate is
moderated by calculation noise and by the expected location and
scale of the v distribution. Most noticeably, increasing calculation
noise increases the preference reversal rate.
Across seven panels, Figure 6 shows the effect of calculation
error and ordinal observation error on preference reversals in each
of the four Wedell conditions. The preference reversal rate in-
Figure 5. Reversals minus inverse reversals for the RF decoy against the predictive location of the distribution
of value v in the environment for multiple levels of calculation observation noise (1 level in each panel) and for
levels of predictive scale (the lines in each panel). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 6. Reversals minus inverse reversals against the probability of an ordinal error for different levels of
calculation noise. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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creases as calculation error increases (across panels) and decreases
as ordinal observation error increases (within panels). We also
tested the effect of probability weighting on preference reversals
(see Appendix A) and the effect of the distance of the RF decoy
from the target (see Appendix B).
Figure 7 shows the effect of a negative correlation r  0
between p and v on preference reversals when calc  0.1 and  
1. We investigated the effect of a negative correlation as it is
plausible that probability and value are negatively correlated in
human experience (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). As expected,
the preference reversal rate is lower with high negative correlation
between p and v than with correlation nearer to zero. In the figure
it can be seen that the effect of negative correlation is fairly flat for
r  0.9. For r  0.9 the preference reversal rate reduces
rapidly until at r  1 the rate become negative. This is because
at r 1 all options have the same expected value and decoys are
selected at the expense of the target. In summary, the analyses in
this section have shown that the model predicts preference rever-
sals as long as the calculation observation is noisy and as long as
the correlation between p and v is greater than about 0.9.
Model fitting. In this section we report the best fit that we
have obtained of the model to the Wedell (1991) effect sizes. First,
the scale and location of the value distribution were set to the scale
and location of the Wedell task distribution. The probability dis-
tribution parameters were held constant at Beta(a  1, b  1) and
the correlation parameter was set to r  0. No further adjustments
to these parameters were made in the following fits to the human
data.
Next the values of the calculation noise, ordinal noise and 
parameters were adjusted so as to fit the model to the Wedell
(1991) data. These parameters were adjusted so as to minimize the
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) between model and data for the
reversal rate, inverse-reversal rate, decoy rate and the difference
between the reversal and inverse reversal rate. (An inverse-reversal
occurred when participants favored the option that did not domi-
nate the decoy.) The fitted values were: calculation noise calc 
0.35, ordinal error P(errorf)  0.1, and probability weighting
parameter   1.5. The average RMSE was 1.2 percentage points.
The decoy rate of the best fitting model was 2%.
Figure 8 contrasts the fitted preference reversals of the model to
the human data. The top bar graph of the figure shows the human
reversals and inverse reversals for each of the Range (R), Fre-
quency (F), Range-Frequency (RF), and Rprime (R’). It shows that
people exhibited more reversals than inverse reversals in all con-
ditions except Rprime. Wedell (1991) report that these results were
significant. The model effects are shown in the bottom bar graph
of Figure 8. More important, the model fit captures the absence of
an effect of Rprime (Wedell, 1991; see also Figure 6).
In addition, we fitted the model to the inverse reversal rate only.
With this model the calculation observation noise, the ordinal
observation error and  were adjusted to fit the model’s inverse
reversal rates to the human data. The reversal rates were not fitted
for this analysis and are, therefore, predictions. The model pre-
dicted preference reversals in R, F, and RF conditions and it
predicted the absence of an effect in Rprime. However, effect sizes
were larger than those observed in humans.
Discussion. The model described above predicts the qualita-
tive preference reversal effects observed by Wedell (1991). It does
so as long as there is some uncertainty in the observation of pi 
vi and as long as there is some partially independent observation of
feature ordinals. Further, it does so in Wedell’s R, F, and RF
conditions and it predicts the absence of an effect in the symmetric
(Rprime) condition, which provides a control.
The reason that the model predicts these contextual preference
reversal effects is that making preference reversals, when obser-
vations are noisy, is an implication of expected value maximizing
choice. The model shows that there is nothing irrational about
preference reversals given these assumptions. In fact, there is no
sense in which making preference reversals reveals a change in
preferences, once it is understood that the choice tasks in these
experiments are choices with uncertainty about expected value.
Given this uncertainty and the availability of partially independent
ordinal observation, the expected value of options is defined by the
analysis provided above. We offer further explanation on the role
of ordinal observation in contextual choices below.
Compromise, Similarity, and Phantom Effects
In this section we use the same theoretical assumptions to
predict the effects of the compromise, similarity, phantom and
inferior but nondominated decoy positions. All but the last of these
decoy positions are illustrated in Figure 9. The last, the inferior but
nondominated decoy position, was set between the compromise
and F position (see Figure 4) so that it was below the line of equal
expected value and not dominated by either option. To model this
scenario, the ordinal observation was made with the decoy present
(as above) but the model was not permitted to select the decoy
(unlike above). The change is only required to model the task and
involves no changes to the theoretical assumptions.
In the left panel of Figure 9, the two possible positions of a
compromise decoy (red triangle) are shown. All three options in a task
have the same expected value and the decoy is known to increase
human preference for the option that lies between the other two on
the line of equal expected value. In the middle panel, the four possible
positions of the similarity decoy position are shown. Again, only one
of these positions is used in any one task. Two of the positions are
outside of the other two options and two are in between. In all cases,
the similarity decoy is very close to the target option and has the same
Figure 7. The effect of a negative correlation between p and v on
preference reversals when calc  0.4. See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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expected value. The phantom positions are shown in the right most
panel. These are illustrated with red triangles that are open to indicate
that they cannot be chosen.
The predictions of the model in the similarity, compromise,
phantom, and inferior nondominated conditions are shown in Fig-
ure 10. Each panel shows the consequences of different levels of
one of the noise parameters when the other parameters were set
to: location  19.60, scale  8.08, Betaa  1, b  1,
Perrorf  0, calc2  2.0, r  0,   1. (The location and scale
of the t-distribution of value are the maximum likelihood values
given Wedell’s materials.) The left panel represents the effect of
calculation noise and the right panel represents the effect of ordinal
error. The panels show the predicted number of target selections
minus the number of competitor selections, where the target is the
option that is proximal to the decoy. This measure is a measure of
the preference for the target over the competitor. It is used instead
of the reversal minus inverse reversal measure used in the previous
section because it is the measure used in the studies reported by
Trueblood et al. (2013) and others. For comparison purposes the
model also shows the number of selections of target minus com-
petitor for the attraction decoy and for when the decoy is absent.
Each line in Figure 10 is for one of the decoy positions. This is an
average of two positions for compromise and phantom decoys and
the average of four positions for the similarity decoy.
The left panel of the figure shows that irrespective of the level
of calculation noise, if the decoy is absent, then each of the two
options are predicted to be selected about half of the time. In
contrast, as calculation noise increases then there is a predicted
positive effect of the attraction and the compromise decoy on
target selections. The compromise decoy prediction is in the same
direction as that observed by Trueblood et al. (2013). The formal
explanation for the compromise effect is in the theoretical assump-
tions described above. Informally, the compromise effect is a
consequence of the expected values of the three options given the
ordinal observation and utility observations. Imagine a set of
randomly sampled option triples given the distributional and cor-
relation properties of the environment. The compromise condition
is a particular subset of this distribution in which pA  pB  pD
and vA  vB  vD. Given the standard definition of the expected
Figure 8. Reversal effects for model fit (bottom) and data from Wedell, 1991 (top). The bar graph shows the
reversal and inverse reversal effects for the four major conditions of the Wedell experiment.
Figure 9. Option positions for compromise, similarity and phantom
choice conditions. In the compromise and similarity tasks only the two
green-circle options and one of the red-triangle options are available. In the
similarity task there are four possible decoy positions all of which have
the same expected value as the other two options. In the phantom case the
decoy option is not available for choice and the phantom option is posi-
tioned so as to dominate one of the other options. See the online article for
the color version of this figure.
378 HOWES, WARREN, FARMER, EL-DEREDY, AND LEWIS
value, then the calculations reported in Figure 10 show that the
expected value of option B is greater than the expected value of
the other two options more frequently than vice versa. However,
the extent to which this outcome is true is dependent on the
environmental parameters; a further analysis of scale and location
of value is provided in Appendix C. In addition, the size of the
compromise effect is moderated by the distance of the compromise
option from the target option; see Appendix D.
Figure 10 also shows the predicted effect of the similarity decoy
and the phantom decoy. The effect of the similarity decoy was found
to be the same for all four pairs of the four similarity decoy positions
and the figure shows the average. When ordinal observation noise is
low, these decoy positions cause the model to predict a reduced
proportion of selections of the option that is close to the decoy, which
is consistent with the observed human behavior (Maylor & Roberts,
2007; Trueblood et al., 2013; Tversky, 1972).
Further investigation of the results revealed that the similarity
prediction is because of substitution; when the similarity decoy is
present then choices that would otherwise have gone to the target
are shared between the target and the decoy, thereby reducing the
number of target selections relative to the situation where the
decoy is absent. Substitution effects have been discussed in con-
sumer choice, and Evers and Lakens (2014) provide evidence that
they explain apparent similarity effects in simple categorization
tasks. As a consequence of the substitution of decoy for target, the
model predicts high rates of decoy selection in the similarity
condition. This prediction is supported by Trueblood (2012) where
the similarity decoy selection rate was about 20% (Trueblood
(2012), p. 966; Figure 3a).
The predicted phantom effect is only present when there is
calculation noise (left panel of Figure 10). As with the similarity
effect, the predicted phantom effect reduces the number of target
selections. This prediction is consistent with some other models,
but not all. The fact that existing models offer inconsistent phan-
tom predictions has been noted before (Scarpi & Pizzi, 2013). Our
model’s phantom prediction is consistent with the results of a
study of lottery choice reported by Soltani et al. (2012). In the
Soltani study, participants were presented with three monetary
gambles on a screen for 8 s and at the end of that period one of the
gambles—the phantom decoy—was removed and the participant
selected one of the remaining gambles within a 2 s period. The
phantom decoy dominated one of the other options. Soltani et al.
(2012, p. 4) found that the phantom decoys decreased the selection
of the target gamble.
While the prediction of our model is consistent with Soltani
et al. (2012), both prediction and data are inconsistent with the
phantom effects observed by (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000, 2007).
Pettibone and Wedell (2007) studied the effect of five phantom
positions in two experiments. The tasks involved consumer
choices such as a choice between computers on the basis of two
dimensions, say memory and speed. The five positions domi-
nated one of the other options on either one dimension or both
and were either closer or further from the target option. The
Pettibone and Wedell (2007) tasks did not involve choices
between gambles, unlike Soltani et al. (2012). In 4 out of 5 of
the decoy conditions in Experiment 1 of Pettibone and Wedell
(2007) a significant positive effect of the phantom decoy was
observed; the phantom decoy increased the proportion of target
selections. The same was true in 2 out of the 5 decoy conditions
in Experiment 2 of Pettibone and Wedell (2007); a significant
effect was absent in 3 of the 5 conditions and, on average, it was
diminished in magnitude. Experiment 2 used a within partici-
pant design and further analysis was conducted to understand
the individual differences. Pettibone and Wedell (2007) split the
participants into three groups, a positive group (N  79), a low
group (N  156), and a negative group (N  27) on the basis
of arbitrary cutoffs in the individual phantom effect size. What
was interesting was the extent to which there was individual
Figure 10. Predicted proportion of target minus competitor selections for five preference reversal conditions
against calculation noise (left panel) and ordinal noise (right panel). The Decoy Absent condition is the control
and represents the two choice task. All parameters, other than those manipulated, were held constant (see text
for details). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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variation in the effect of the phantom decoy. Of the three
groups, only the group of 79 of the 262 participants generated
a reliable positive phantom decoy effect in all five of the decoy
conditions. The result for the largest group of participants (N 
156) were either mixed or absent (there was little compelling
evidence for a positive or negative phantom effect). The result
for the relatively small group of participants (N  27) was a
negative phantom effect (as predicted by our analysis). Al-
though this was the smallest group, the negative effect was
present in all five of the phantom conditions and the magnitude
of the negative effect for this group was about the same size as
the magnitude of the positive effect exhibited by the positive
group.
In summary, our analysis of the effect of the phantom decoy
suggests that the average behavior of the participants studied by
Soltani et al. (2012) was rational; by making ordinal observa-
tions relative to an unavailable option suppresses the selection
of options dominated by a phantom, these participants were
behaving in a way that is consistent with an observer that seeks
to maximize the expected value of selected gambles given
noise. Similarly, the individual differences analysis provided by
Pettibone and Wedell (2007) suggests that at least a small group
of their participants made rational, expected value maximizing
decisions, when presented with consumer choice triads that
included a phantom decoy.
Time Pressure Effects
A number of studies suggest that the rate of contextual
preference reversals diminishes as time pressure increases
(Dhar, Nowlis, & Sherman, 2000; Pettibone, 2012; Simonson,
1989; Trueblood et al., 2014). In particular, Pettibone (2012)
has shown an effect of manipulating the time available to view
options on the compromise and attraction effect. In a between-
participants design participants were given 2, 4, 6, or 8 s to view
a three alternative, two attribute, choice set and then asked to
choose. The results of Pettibone’s study are presented in the top
panels of Figure 11. The top left panel is for the attraction decoy
positions and the top middle panel for the compromise posi-
tions. In both figures lower time pressure is to the right on the
x-axis and higher time pressure to the left. As time pressure
increases—right-to-left—it can be seen that the differences
between the target, competitor, and decoy selection proportions
diminishes. It can also be seen that the decoy option is selected
more frequently in the compromise condition than in the attrac-
tion condition. The effect of time pressure on the human sim-
ilarity effect was not investigated by Pettibone (2012) and is not
illustrated, but has been demonstrated empirically by Trueblood
et al. (2014) who found that time pressure diminished the
magnitude of the effect.
The model’s predictions, bottom panels of Figure 11, are
based on the assumptions that (a) even when there is no time
pressure there is some noise in the calculation observation and,
therefore, uncertainty about the expected value of the option
(this is the same assumption as has been made in all previous
analyses in the current article), and (b) the ability of participants
to accurately perceive ordinal feature relationships diminishes
with time pressure and, therefore, the model parameter P(er-
rorf) increases with time pressure. Calculation observation error
was fitted to Pettibone’s data calc  .5. This value is substan-
tially higher than the fitted value for the model of Wedell
(1991), perhaps reflecting higher uncertainty in Pettibone
(2012)’s participant’s estimates of subjective expected value. In
the Figure, effect on target, competitor and decoy selections is
shown against increasing—right-to-left— ordinal observation
error. The attraction and compromise effects are larger at lower
ordinal observation error than at higher ordinal observation
error. In both model and humans, increased time pressure is
accompanied by a decrease in the target selection rate and an
increase in the competitor and decoy selection rates.
While Figure 11 shows that the quantitative fit of the time
pressure effect is excellent for the attraction and compromise
data reported by Pettibone (2012), the results are a less good
prediction of the effect of time pressure on the similarity effect
reported by Trueblood et al. (2014). However, the time pressure
effects reported by Trueblood et al. (2014) were for tasks with
very different time profiles (a legal inference task and a per-
ceptual size judgment task) to that studied by Pettibone (2012).
Given the differences in the tasks we have not conducted a cross-
experiment comparison of the effect sizes. The important point is
that the similarity predictions are in the same direction as the
human data; time pressure diminishes the effect size.
The Consequences of Ordinal Observation for
Preference Reversals
The analysis above demonstrates that the choice model pre-
sented previously in the article can predict human performance on
a range of contextual choice tasks. Here, we offer two further
analyses so as to help explain why the model predicts preference
reversals.
The Implications of Ordinal Observation for
Expected Value
We have shown that an expected value maximizing model that
makes noisy calculation observations and noisy ordinal observations
makes choices between options that is influenced by the addition of
new options, and gives rise to a pattern of preference reversals that is
in many cases strikingly similar to the human data. The key to
understanding these findings is to understand the implications of
ordinal observation for the expected value of choice. An analysis of
attraction decoy choice tasks given perfect ordinal observation is
provided in Figure 12 where a problem consists of three options A, B,
and D and each option is described in terms of a pair of random
variables; a random probability p and a random value v. Figure 12a
and 12b represent the densities of these random variables for prob-
lems with the reported parametric values and Figure 12c represents
the density of the expected values of these options assuming that there
are no constraints on their relative value.
Decoy absent choice problems (Figure 12d) are constructed by
sampling p and v values for only two options A and B and
accepting samples for which constraint J holds.
J pA  pB, vB  vA (10)
The densities of the expected values of these options are repre-
sented in Figure 12d. Notice that there is a small difference in the
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expected values of A and B, which derives from the asymmetric
contribution of probability and value to expected value. Notice too
that the advantage in this case is in favor of B; on average B is a
better choice than A in the two choice scenario.
Typically, a constraint is imposed in the decoy present condition
of a preference reversal experiment. This constraint can be repre-
sented with the following inequalities.
L pA pD pB, vB vA vD (11)
L captures the fact that A must strictly dominate D but also that
B does not dominate, and is not dominated by, D or A on either
dimension. Decoy present problems are constructed by sampling p
and v pairs for each of the three options from the distributions
illustrated in Figure 12a and 12b and only accepting problems in
which L holds. For these cases Figure 12e represents the densities
of E. It is clear in Figure 12e that, on average, option A has a higher
expected value than the other options. The preference for B in the
two choice task has been altered to a preference for A in the
attraction decoy situation.
In Figure 12f the mean values of p and v for each of A, B, and
D are represented along with 95% confidence intervals (Cis),
which are smaller than the plotted points, and lines representing
Figure 11. Top panels: Observed effects of time pressure on attraction and compromise effects (similarity not
tested) for human target selections, from “Testing the Effect of Time Pressure on Asymmetric Dominance and
Compromise Decoys in Choice,” by J. C. Pettibone, 2012, Judgment and Decision Making, 7, pp. 516–517.
Copyright 2012 by the Society for Judgment and Decision Making. Bottom panels: Predicted effect of ordinal
observation error on preference reversals (x-axis reversed). From left to right: attraction, compromise and
similarity decoys. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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equal expected value.2 These values are the average values of p
and v given the constraint L. In Figure 12f, it is clear that, given the
prior distributions of p and v when the dominance relationship L
holds, selecting A is expected value maximizing.
The above analysis shows that it can be entirely rational for a
person to select a dominating option A rather than a nondominating
option B when a decoy is present, even when there should be an
advantage for B over A when the decoy is absent. The analysis
thereby explains the empirical observations of Huber et al. (1982)
and also Wedell (1991) as rational choice given uncertainty about
the utility of options.
Figure 13 extends the previous analysis to the compromise and
similarity effects. Probabilities and values were sampled from
distributions with the same parameters as in Figure 12 and then
subsets of options were sampled according to the constraints of the
condition (two-options, attraction, compromise, or similarity). The
top left panel of the figure shows the expected values of two
options that correspond to constraint J (see above; one option has
higher probability and the other higher value). In the middle panel
of the left column, the expected values of the three attraction
options, when the decoy is dominated by the high probability
option, is shown. This panel shows the same result as that shown
in Figure 12. The bottom left panel is also for the attraction
condition but here the decoy is dominated by the low probability
option. The figure shows the reversal in the order of the expected
values of the two superior options when the decoy position
changes. The middle panel extends the analysis to the compromise
condition. Here the constraint used for the middle column, middle
row compromise plot (Compromise A) was:
Lcomp vB vA vD, pD pA pB, | ED	ET | ,
| ED	EC |  (12)
2 All values were calculated using numerical simulation given 10 million
samples of A, B, and D probabilities and values.
Figure 12. (a and b) Values of p for each option were sampled from a  distribution with shape parameters
(2, 2) and values of v were sampled, independently, from a Gaussian distribution with mean  3, SD  2. (c)
The density of expected values, E  p  v, of options given no constraints. (d) Densities of E | J for each of
two options. (e) Densities of E | L for the three options that include the decoy. (f) E of each of the three options
and their equal expected value curves given L. J and L are ordinal constraints specified in the text. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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where  represents some small difference to ensure that the decoy
has an expected value E close to that of both A and B. Lastly, for
one of the similarity conditions, the constraint was,
Lsim pA pB, vB pA, | vB	 vD | , | pB	 pD | 
(13)
The figure shows which option has the highest expected value
changes with decoy position in the attraction (left column) and com-
promise condition (middle column). In the similarity condition, the
decoy is substituted for the target, splitting the target’s share of the
choices.
A Formal Model for Decision Problems With
Ordinal Observation
In this section, we demonstrate that preference reversals are also a
consequence of expected value maximization given utility ordinals.
We assume a decision maker that has no a priori knowledge about the
utility of presented options. We model this situation with two options,
A and B, with utilities that are random variables, UA and UB, sampled
from the same distribution. Assuming UA  UB and in the absence of
any other information pUA  UB 
1
2.
Given the addition of a third random variable UD, also sampled
from the same distribution, where UD  UA and a dominance
constraint K  UB  UD, then by a simple application of Bayes’
rule we see that pUB  UA K  pUB  UA and K ⁄ pK. The
numerator and denominator can be calculated simply by listing all
six possible and equally likely dominance relationships between
the three values. In three of these scenarios, namely UB 
UA  UD, UB  UD  UA and (UA  UB  UD) the constraint
K holds; consequently, p(K)  36. However, in only two dominance
relationships, namely (UE  UA  UD) and (UE  UD  UA), do
both K and UB  UA hold. It follows that the numerator p
UB  UA and K 
2
6 and that pUB  UA K 
2
3.
As a result, given a choice between random variables UA, UB,
and UD, it will be optimal to prefer UB over UA given only the
information that UB  UD. In other words, if UB dominates UD
then UB should be preferred over UA. This analysis shows that it is
rational for a preference ordering between two options to be
influenced by information about the relative value between one of
Figure 13. The expected value of each of three options given ordinal constraints on their probabilities and
values. The left top panel is for two options, one of which has a higher probability and a lower value. The left
middle and bottom panels are for the attraction constraint, the middle column for the compromise constraint and
the right column for similarity. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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these options and a third option. This analysis holds as long as
there is some uncertainty about the value of the options and the
distribution of utilities is bounded.
General Discussion
We have presented an analysis of choice that demonstrates that
preference reversals are a consequence of expected value maximi-
zation in the face of noisy observations of options. The analysis
assumes two observations: one observation is a noisy, and possibly
biased, calculation of subjective expected utility for each option
and the other is a noisy observation of the partial orderings of
features across options. Contextual preference reversals are pre-
dicted when the calculation observation is uncertain and when the
ordinal and calculation observations are partially independent.
Under these conditions an expected value maximizing model will
exhibit preference reversals in the attraction, compromise, and
similarity conditions. In addition, the analysis showed that rational
choice predicts a number of other preference reversal effects,
including the (target suppressing) phantom effect, the inferior
nondominated effect, the effect of time pressure and the difference
in magnitude of the time pressure effect between compromise and
attraction conditions.
An implication of the analyses is that people who observe
ordinal relationships, subject to noise in their calculation of sub-
jective expected utility, will make better decisions (gain higher
value) than people who do not. If a person who reverses prefer-
ences in the presence of a dominated option does so in environ-
ments where the choice matters, then the extent to which they
maximize expected value will be greater than if they do not. It is
for this reason that preference reversals are not irrational or illog-
ical; nor are they necessarily a departure from the axioms of
rationality as they should be applied to understanding the behavior
of computationally bounded minds. On the contrary, under the
assumptions of the model presented here, a person who fails to
reverse preferences will fail to gain the maximum expected value
available to a model that can only make noisy observations of
options.
One potential limitation of the analysis is that it says only a little
about the underlying information processing mechanisms. The
extent to which rational analysis can inform theories of mechanism
has been the subject of a recent debate (Bowers & Davis, 2012;
Griffiths, Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012; Hahn, 2014; McClelland
et al., 2010; Norris & Kinoshita, 2010). From one point of view
our analysis says only that a rational information processing mech-
anism should make preference reversals when new options are
added to the context. This is a contribution at the level of compu-
tational theory (Marr, 1982; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). It is made
by studying the environment of cognition, as recommended by
Anderson (1990). However, our analysis says more. By virtue of
the fact that decisions are bounded by limitations on a person’s
ability to calculate the expected value of options, the analysis
reveals the rational choice given the hypothesized bounds. In this
sense, the analysis shows that preference reversals are computa-
tionally rational (Howes et al., 2009; Lewis et al., 2014). Specif-
ically, the analysis suggests that under uncertainty induced by the
inevitable limitations of biological information processing sys-
tems, a mechanism can improve the expected value of choice if it
makes and uses ordinal observations.
The analysis of rationality that we have used adopts a method-
ological optimality approach, as advocated by Oaksford and
Chater (1994). While the models make use of optimization to gain
their explanatory force, they do not demand that people perform
optimizations, nor that they maximize expected value to the extent
shown to be possible by the particular account above.
Our analysis shows that preference reversals are a consequence
of expected value maximization but not that expected value max-
imization is required for preference reversals. There are many
algorithms for integrating information from multiple sources that
would not be optimal but that would generate higher expected
value than either the calculation or ordinal observations alone. A
bounded information processing system that could only compute
approximate estimates of expected value, for example, should still
exhibit preference reversals so long as it has some capacity to
make ordinal observations. In these circumstances, the use of
ordinal observations leads to preference reversals and to better
decisions as a consequence.
An implication of this observation is that a wide range of
theories of the cognitive mechanisms that predict preference re-
versals may be rationally adapted to the choice task. DFT, LCA,
and Range-Normalization, which offer process explanations of
how contextual reversals might arise as a consequence of interac-
tions between units in a parallel distributed network (Bhatia, 2013;
Roe et al., 2001; Usher et al., 2008) or interactions between
neurons (Soltani et al., 2012), may be mechanism theories of
rational choice given processing limitations. Further, it is conceiv-
able that the rank dependent mechanisms proposed and reviewed
in Roe et al. (2001); Tsetsos, Chater, and Usher (2012); Tversky
and Simonson (1993); Usher et al. (2008); or the comparison only
models (Stewart et al., 2006; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown,
2011), are rational. In other words, making comparisons between
features of options, by whatever means, may just be an efficient
way for a bounded information processing system to deal with the
inevitable uncertainty that attends the noisy integration of features.
What the analysis in the current article shows is that, contrary to
some views, these mechanisms and strategies may generate ratio-
nal rather than distorted choices under uncertainty.
Our approach has common purpose with a number of recent
contributions that demonstrate that preference reversals can be
rational under a range of assumptions (Bordley, 1992; McNamara
et al., 2014; Shenoy & Yu, 2013; Trimmer, 2013). As we said,
Bordley (1992) argued that individuals have prior expectations
about the value of lotteries and if these are taken into account
according to Bayesian principles, then preference reversals will
follow. He points out that a correct application of expected utility
theory—that takes into account priors—can lead to very different
decision outcomes than those advertised in much of the decision
making literature. Trimmer (2013) shows that violations of regu-
larity and independence can be optimal in an evolutionary context.
In two models he considers an animal choosing which herd of prey
to attack. The models demonstrate that even options that are never
chosen by an animal can be relevant to a decision and it is,
therefore, not the case that violations of regularity indicate subop-
timal behavior. McNamara et al. (2014) uses a foraging model to
show that an animal that is maximizing its rate of food gain can
violate transitivity and IIA (Independence from Irrelevant Alter-
natives). However, unlike in our model, McNamara et al.’s model
only demonstrates violations of independence when choices may
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not be available in the future (as happens in real-world foraging
environments).
Shenoy and Yu (2013) also describe a Bayesian model of
contextual choice. It is a normative account, following Marr
(1982)’s framework, and informed by economic theory, in which
the assumptions concern what people believe is fair in the mar-
ketplace. In contrast, our model is focused on what is rational
given the constraints imposed by cognitive mechanisms. Further,
where we focus on the combination of multiple uncertain obser-
vations of the task, Shenoy and Yu (2013) assume that uncertainty
in posterior beliefs about market conditions contributes to random-
ness in choice on repeated presentations of the same options (see
also Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2012) for an analysis of
choice variability and preference consistency). The essence of
Shenoy and Yu (2013)’s explanation is that the introduction of a
decoy moves “the indifference line,” which is an estimate of fair
value in a perceived market. The essence of our explanation is that
ordinal observations allow a decision maker to make improved
estimates of expected values. Furthermore, an important difference
is our derivation that pUB  UA UB  UD 
2
3 that links the
contextual preference reversal phenomena to other decision mak-
ing behaviors that can be explained with an analysis of the Monty
Hall problem (for example, see Chen, 2008; Krauss & Wang,
2003). This analysis (explained above) provides a general demon-
stration of the rationality of preference reversals.
Our analysis (and the other rational analyses) still faces
substantial challenges in showing that all of the empirical
phenomena—including some that are explained by existing pro-
cess accounts—are a consequence of expected value maximiza-
tion. For example, Bhatia (2013) not only explains contextual
preference reversals but also decision making effects such as the
less-is-more effect, the alignability effect, and gain-loss asymme-
try. In addition, Scarpi and Pizzi (2013) demonstrate empirically
that the phantom decoy can either suppress or enhance the pro-
portion of target selections. In their study, they manipulated
whether or not a decoy was “known.” In the “known” condition,
the participants were told, before selecting an option, that the
decoy (the best option) would not be available. In the “unknown”
condition, the participants were allowed to choose before the
decoy was subsequently withdrawn, resulting in most participants
choosing the decoy only to then be told that it is not available. The
effect of the phantom was to enhance target selection in the known
condition and to suppress target selection in the unknown condi-
tion. Our model is not a sequential process model and there is no
straightforward means of generating different predictions for
known and unknown scenarios. However, these data will have to
be addressed in the future.
An additional challenge concerns the computational complexity
of the analysis. Our current computational simulation requires
billions of simulation trials (one billion take about 20 min on a
modern desktop computer) to calculate the expected values of
three options and the number of trials required would grow with
more options. However, there is no theoretical problem posed
here. The theory does not need to be generalized to the case of
larger option set size; it is well-defined for any set size. However,
there are nevertheless two important issues that arise in consider-
ing large set sizes. The first concerns the tractability of generating
the predictions of the model. For larger set sizes, there is no doubt
that more efficient algorithms for approximating optimal solutions
will be required. It is beyond the scope of our current work to
pursue that now. The second issue concerns whether future em-
pirical shortcomings of the model might be identified and under-
stood to be related to human bounds on integrating observations
and managing a large decision space. We think this is also an
interesting area to pursue for future work.
What can we now say about Tversky and Simonson’s (1993),
and others, rejection of people as value maximizers—a rejection
that has in part led to the popular belief that people are irrational
(Simonson, 2014)? We have shown that preference reversals are a
consequence of value maximization and noisy observations. Our
analysis makes the simple assumption, uncontroversial in statisti-
cal decision theory, that value maximization given uncertainty
should make use of available noisy information to calculate the
expected value of options. Value maximization requires making
best use of all of the information available according to its preci-
sion, and doing so leads to preference reversals. Our analysis not
only shows that contextual preference reversals should not be
taken as evidence against value maximizing in people. It also
shows that preference reversals should be read as evidence that
people are value maximizing given the limitations of their neural
mechanisms—that is, they are computationally rational.
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Appendix A
The Effect of Probability Weighting on Preference Reversals
Figure A1 shows that the probability weighting parameter  in Equa-
tion 4 has little effect on the preference reversal rate irrespective of the
level of calculation noise. Preference reversals are observed for all plotted
levels of . In other words, preference reversals are predicted by an
expected value maximizer irrespective of the presence or absence of bias
in its estimate of its own subjective expected utility.
Figure A1. The effect of  and calculation noise on preference reversal rate for the four conditions in the
Wedell (1991) studies. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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Appendix B
The Effect of RF Decoy Distance on Preference Reversals
Figure B1 shows that the preference reversal effect diminishes as a
function of the distance of the RF decoy from the target choice. This is
consistent with the effect observed by Soltani et al. (2012). All noise
parameters were set to the values used in Attraction Effects.
Figure B1. The magnitude of the RF preference reversal effect against the distance of the decoy from the target.
The x-axis shows the difference between the target value (v) and the decoy value. The probability of the decoy
was adjusted with v to maintain the RF decoy position.
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Appendix C
The Effect of the Value Distribution Parameters on the Compromise Effect
Figure C1 shows the effect of the location and scale of the value
distribution on the magnitude of the compromise effect. The
compromise effect is smaller at higher values of location. The
effect of location interacts with the effect of scale.
Figure C1. The magnitude of the compromise effect for three levels of the scale of the value distribution
against the location of the value distribution. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
(Appendices continue)
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Appendix D
The Effect of the Compromise Decoy Distance on Preference Reversals
Figure D1 shows the effect of the distance of the compromise
decoy from the target choice. Noise parameters were the fitted
parameters derived in Attraction Effects. At distance  0, the
decoy is in a similarity decoy position and the preference reversal
effect is, therefore, negative. The effect size increases as the decoy
is moved away from the target choice and then plateaus.
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Figure D1. The magnitude of the compromise effect against decoy distance for two levels of calculation noise.
See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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